“Come to Yemen... “ This is an appeal by Nayef bin Mohamed Al-Khatany (Abu Humam), a Saudi member of Al Qaeda who is wanted by Saudi security forces and is believed to be hiding in Yemen. Al-Khatany was recently accused by the Yemen authorities of being the main financier of the two major attacks on Yemen’s oil installations in Marib and Hadramaut carried out by Al Qaeda in Yemen in September 2006. The ‘call’ appeared in the March edition of Sada al-Malahim, the organisation’s magazine that surfaced for the first time on Jihad websites early this year.

The magazine published a two-part interview with Al-Khatany. Asked why he, as a Saudi, decided to come to Yemen instead of fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan, Al-Khatany said that Saudi Arabia remains the main battlefield for two reasons: its symbolic value as the home of Islam and its strategic value as the major oil producer and supplier.

The Khatany statement admits that the Al Qaeda branch in Saudi Arabia has lost its battle in the Kingdom as most of its members have been either killed or are in prison. He calls upon the remaining members of the Saudi branch to migrate to Yemen without delay “in order to escape sure arrest by Saudi authorities.”

In his statement he invites his “brother mujahideen in the land of the two holy places” (Saudi Arabia) to join him and his colleagues who have already moved to Yemen, asserting that the “liberation” of the land of the two holy places “starts from here.”

Al-Khatany calls for united efforts, and urges that the “life and the money of the Saudi mujahideen” be combined with the “land, life and the experiences of the Yemeni brothers.”

It is noteworthy that the appeal “come to Yemen” coincides with the adoption of a new name for Al Qaeda in Yemen in its latest publication. Until recently the Yemen branch was using the name “Al Qaeda in Yemen.” The new name “Al Qaeda in the Southern Arabian Peninsula” indicates a possible link with the Saudi branch known as “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”

The impact of a possible alliance, or even merger, between the Saudi and Yemeni branches of Al Qaeda on the security situation in the region will depend on what Al Qaeda in Yemen is aiming for and what its strategies are. Does it intend to attract Saudi fighters to develop Yemen into a major battlefield, or does it aim to create a ‘safe haven’ using the country as a backyard to support rebuilding the Saudi branch and to conduct operations in Saudi Arabia at a later stage?

The increase in the frequency of attacks in Yemen could be taken by some as an indication of the group’s intention to turn the country into a battlefield. Targeting tourism and oil infrastructure hits the government at its most vulnerable point — the economy — and it negatively affects efforts to attract foreign investment.

However, at this time it seems rather doubtful if Al Qaeda in Yemen has the capacity, or the intention to turn Yemen into a battlefield. Over the past months, attacks by the group have escalated but lacked effectiveness. It is likely that Al Qaeda in Yemen is under pressure as many of its members have been killed or imprisoned, and some are on the run.

For that reason the group’s attacks may be seen as acts of self-defence rather than an indication of renewed strength. A possible cooperation between the Yemeni and Saudi branches at this stage could strengthen both groups.

The Yemeni group would gain experience and financial support, while the Saudi one could be provided with a safe haven. In the past both groups have agreed about the crucial value of Yemen as the main logistical backyard to carry on the battle inside Saudi Arabia.

If the intention is now to strengthen the country’s role as a ‘backyard’ both groups will be required to keep a low profile to avoid confrontation with Yemeni security forces. With its unique geographic location, strong tribal system, and long mountainous border with Saudi Arabia, Yemen could serve as a sanctuary for militant Islamists rather than as the main battlefield.

The alliance between Yemeni and Saudi militants is a matter of great concern for Saudi Arabia. The security of Yemen and Saudi Arabia are decisively linked; experience in the past has shown that militants using Yemen as a backyard could constitute a major threat to the Kingdom’s national security. With the recent activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen, the Kingdom could potentially face an increasing threat from terrorists crossing the Yemeni-Saudi border. Militants will be recruited and trained in Yemen; they will only cross the border to conduct operations in the Kingdom.

It will be difficult for Saudi security forces to prevent such “border to target” operations, as they are extremely difficult to detect. Often, there is only a short time, about 12-24 hours, between terrorists crossing the border and the attack itself. To deal with this kind of threat Saudi Arabia’s security forces would have to rely heavily on fast and precise information from their Yemeni counterparts.

They would also need to beef up border security.

Currently, thousands of illegal immigrants cross the border every year raising doubts about the security forces’ capability to cope with such an emerging security threat.

For Al Qaeda headquarters, the strengthening of relations between the Yemeni and Saudi groups is a positive development as the organization’s leadership has supported the establishment of transnational or regional organisations. Ayman Al-Zawahiri blessed the foundation of “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” that developed into a flexible network operating in five North African states and, over the past months, has proved its capability to operate region-wide.

Similar is the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the tribal border area serves as a backyard for cross-border operations in Afghanistan. If the Yemeni and Saudi groups’ alliance is successful, could this take a pattern similar to the Afghan-Pakistan experience? 

The question that arises now is whether the call of the Yemenis to unite forces with their ‘Saudi brothers’ can be taken as the first indicator of an emerging transnational Al Qaeda structure in the Arabian Peninsula? Jihad is global, it has no state, no borders or nationalities. It only remains to be seen whether a possible alliance between Yemeni and Saudi mujahideen will be a tactical “marriage of convenience” or a strategic partnership.

* Khaleej Times